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Abstract—Evaluating the security of cyber-physical systems
throughout their life cycle is necessary to assure that they can
be deployed and operated in safety-critical applications, such
as infrastructure, military, and transportation. Most safety and
security decisions that can have major effects on mitigation
strategy options after deployment are made early in the system’s
life cycle. To allow for a vulnerability analysis before deployment,
a sufficient well-formed model has to be constructed. To construct
such a model we produce a taxonomy of attributes; that is, a
generalized schema for system attributes. This schema captures
the necessary specificity that characterizes a possible real system
and can also map to the attack vector space associated with the
model’s attributes. In this way, we can match possible attack
vectors and provide architectural mitigation at the design phase.
We present a model of a flight control system encoded in the
Systems Modeling Language, commonly known as SysML, but
also show agnosticism with respect to the modeling language or
tool used.
I. INTRODUCTION
A major challenge in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [1] is
the assessment of the system’s security posture at the early
stages of its life cycle. In the defense community, it has been
estimated that 70-80% of the decisions affecting safety and
security are made in the early concept development stages of a
project [2]–[5]. Therefore, it is advantageous for this assessment
to take place before lines of code are written and designs are
finalized. To allow for security analysis at the design phase,
a system model has to be constructed, and that model must
reasonably characterize a system and be sufficiently detailed to
enable matching attack vectors mined from databases. Matching
possible attack vectors to the system model facilitates detection
of possible security vulnerabilities in timely fashion. One
can then design systems that are secure by design instead
of potentially having to add bolt-on security features later in
the process, an approach that can be prohibitively expensive
and limited in its mitigation options. Consequently, employing a
model reduces costs and highlights the importance of security as
part of the design process of CPS. We propose a model encoded
in the Systems Modeling Language (SysML), a graphical object
oriented modeling language [6].
Our justification for using a solution based on SysML is
twofold: it facilitates the implementation of any changes to
This research is based upon work supported by the Systems Engineering
Research Center under Award No. 2017-RT-172.
the design of CPS and is a tool familiar to and often used by
systems engineers. However, as we do not want to limit the
core ideas to SysML, we show that the model is transformable
to a graph structure, thus demonstrating that it is agnostic to
the particular modeling language or tool used.
To accurately characterize the system with respect to its
associated security audit, the model requires a taxonomic
scheme consisting of predefined categories. This schema is
necessary to describe a potentially realizable or realized system.
By extension the model, then, represents a real system without
necessarily requiring one to be built. To develop this schema,
we investigate attack vector databases and examine their entries
and their intra and inter connections. To represent the reality
of the system, the chosen categories and their corresponding
attributes need to correctly capture the hardware and software
elements controlling the CPS as well as the interactions in the
system model. The categories must be chosen in such a way
that the model has sufficient fidelity and can be used to find
attack vectors from open databases.
Since the model drives the vulnerability analysis, it needs to
reflect relevant cyber-oriented information required to match
possible attack vectors within the aforementioned categories.
This additional information is encoded in the attributes of
a subsystem and normally comes from preexisting design
documentation, subject matter expertise, and requirements
documentation. The amount and level of specificity that needs
to be embodied in the attributes of each component depends
on whether it matches the natural language that describes the
attack vectors within the vulnerability databases. Therefore,
the attributes need to represent the system’s hardware and
software composition so that they match possible entries in the
databases. Only then can a system model become attackable,
enabling us to infer possible vulnerabilities in the system’s
architecture and propose preemption and mitigation strategies.
Construction of a model with the characteristics described
above gives rise to two main challenges. The first is the com-
plexity in creating a complete schema that is able to capture—
through the attributes—the necessary detail to represent the
cyber aspects of an actual system. This first challenge also needs
to take into account the importance of reasonably allowing the
maintenance of any given CPS model that contains both cyber
attributes and non-cyber attributes. The second is the difficulty
in coordinating the available vulnerability data, the hierarchy
within the databases that contain that data, and finally, the way978-1-5386-3664-0/18/$31.00 ©2018 IEEE
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Fig. 1. The fidelity of the attributes describing a CPS has to achieve a
balance between the amount of information that is captured in the model and
the difficulty of producing it. At the extremes, the attributes can either be
uninformative and incomplete or too detailed, requiring a prohibitive amount
of modeling effort. Part of the challenge to being model sufficient is producing
a sound, well-formed model for vulnerability assessment that can be practically
utilized by systems engineers.
in which the information is captured in their entries.
A. The Challenge of Capturing a Sufficient Set of Attributes
Indeed, there are tradeoffs between specificity and the number
of attributes we can impose on a modeling methodology before
it becomes impractical. This tradeoff can be illustrated by
considering the extremities of model fidelity (Fig. 1). On
the one side of the spectrum (Low-Low) the model does
not correctly characterize an actual system and its potential
vulnerability to existing threats, while on the other side of the
spectrum (High-High) the model requires a prohibitive amount
of modeling effort.
Being model-driven in the context of cybersecurity has an
additional requirement beyond ensuring fidelity to the real
system. It also requires integrating the attributes taken from a
design specification documentation, such that an analyst can
match possible attack patterns to the model. This challenge is
partially solved by understanding and using several repositories
of attacks and vulnerabilities (Section V). However, it still
does not guarantee that possible query words—word lists that
are used to associate potential vulnerabilities with a given
set of attributes—will produce attack vectors applicable to
that subsystem. Therefore, we need to capture the design
documentation only to a point where there is agreement between
two perspectives; (i) fidelity to the system’s behavior and
structure and (ii) the system’s corresponding attack vectors.
B. Challenge of Understanding Diverse Vulnerability Data
Unfortunately, there is no single repository that contains
all possible exploitation techniques or vulnerabilities that can
apply to complex systems like CPS. If there was one, it would
have to span across several domains—e.g., embedded devices,
networks, humans in the loop—and have multiple levels of
specificity for each entry in order to match every element in the
system model. We leverage several databases with the goal of
addressing all domains and at different levels of specificity, thus
leading to new insights about the system’s security posture. We
then need to understand the different possible repositories, what
information they contain, how they capture that information in
natural language and what the targeted scope of each database
is. By gaining that understanding, we extend the schema to
incorporate data from diverse resources and ensure a thorough
and rigorous security assessment.
Finally, the level of abstraction of each repository has to
match the attributes in the model. At the very least, this requires
a database that matches the attributes in the model. Ideally,
however, there would be several databases that provide layers
of abstraction. This is the case with a set of databases that
are hierarchical and interconnected, e.g., CAPEC,1 CWE,2
CVE.3 For this set of databases, CVE can match to the model
attributes (since its vulnerability entries resides at a lower
level of abstraction than the other two) and then be used
to infer possible classes of attacks by mapping CVE entries
to their corresponding, higher-level, CWE and/or CAPEC
entries. The utility of this hierarchy is also important when
reasoning about the threat space associated with the system.
By abstracting the individual exploited vulnerabilities to more
general weaknesses and/or patterns, this approach reduces the
amount of information an analyst has to parse and reason with
when they inspect a complex system model for applicable
attacks.
C. State of the Art
Model-based techniques for assessing cybersecurity have
been at the forefront of recent research in CPS. These
traditionally stem from dependability and safety analysis. Nicol
et al. [7] have stated the need for model-based methods
for assessing security that come from the general area of
dependability. Further, Chen et al. [8] have proposed a model-
based graph oriented analysis technique for assessing a system
for acceptable safety based on a workflow. Kopetz [9] presents
the notion of categories of interfaces to model real-time systems.
Davis et al. [10] present a framework that extends the notion
of dependability to include possible security violation for the
power grid that utilizes state estimation and is evaluated in a
simulated model of the power grid. More recently, Brunner et
al. [11] proposed a combined model for safety and security
that is based on Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams.
These models reside in a higher level of abstraction than
1Common Attack Pattern Enumeration & Classification, capec.mitre.org
2Common Weakness Enumeration, cwe.mitre.org
3Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures, cve.mitre.org
our proposed model; they do not contain the structure of the
system, do not consider evidence-based security assessment,
assessment based on previous reported vulnerability data, and
the evaluation targets certification of policy standards.
In general, little work has been done to determine whether
a model contains the necessary attributes stemming from the
design documents and encoded through a structural model to
be used in evidence-based cyber-vulnerability assessment. Even
less work has been done in targeting the model sufficiency of
CPS and how that is used at the early stages of the design
process. For the cybersecurity assessment of CPS, no standard
rule-of-thumb, or otherwise generally accepted procedure has
been established.
D. Contributions of this Research
The central contribution of this paper is the characterization
and definition of the problem of agreement between system
model and historic attack vector databases and tackling the
difficulty of matching the two when it comes to CPS. Therefore,
this research presents solutions to the two main challenges
outlined above. First, it shows how to capture the relevant
information within those schema categories based on design
documentation that preexists the model. Second, it demonstrates
how to appropriately handle historic data to identify possible
vulnerabilities in the system’s design. Both challenges can
be solved by methodically constructing a model through a
predefined taxonomic scheme. Toward those objectives, the
model is built based on the following insights:
1) a necessary understanding of historic information is
needed to match against a system description;
2) a system description needs to be evaluated as being
realistic and it is characterized by attributes to an extent
that can match possible attack vectors; and
3) agnosticism toward modeling language or tool.
This paper focuses on model sufficiency with respect
to vulnerabilities, with the explicit recognition that these
vulnerabilities can give rise to unsafe or undesired behavior in
the overall, coupled CPS. Moreover, this paper demonstrates
how vulnerabilities propagate to physical system behavior but
it is outside the defined scope to analyze the physical behavior
and/or determine whether it is (un)safe or (un)desirable.
To assess the sufficiency of the model we present a model
of a generic Flight Control System (FCS) and assess the
possible security violations of two system components using
open vulnerability databases.
II. A TAXONOMIC SCHEME FOR CPS ATTRIBUTES
Our main objective is to construct a general purpose
taxonomic scheme that can be used to characterize the cyber
components of a CPS and their interactions, for the purpose
of relating to attack vectors. To this end, we use preexisting
design specification documentation to describe the attributes
of the cyber components and encode this information in the
model. To methodically achieve this we first present definitions
for cyber component, attack vector, cyber attribute, evidence,
and taxonomic scheme. These definitions provide common
ground on the relatively generic term “cyber,” which is used
in several contexts and, therefore, can hold different meanings.
A. Primitives
Our model of CPS makes a distinction between cyber
and physical components. Caution is necessary because the
components of a CPS can reside in between the cyber and
physical realms but their behavior and form can be described
by either. This paper is intended only to identify the minimum
set of attributes necessary to assess a CPS’s cybersecurity
posture.
Definition 1. A CYBER COMPONENT of a cyber-physical
system is any device that is programmable and whose associated
computation observes or controls physical quantities, e.g.,
velocity, altitude, etc.
Definition 2. An ATTACK VECTOR is a specific description of
an attack on a given subsystem. It presents the features of the
exploited vulnerability, the privilege access level required for
an attacker to perform the attack, and the steps to perform it.
Definition 3. A CYBER ATTRIBUTE defining a subsystem of
a cyber-physical system represents possible specification of
behavior, form, or structure. Hence, the set of attributes produce
an architectural definition of the subsystem and represent the
part(s) of the model that maps to possible attack vectors.
Definition 4. EVIDENCE is all instances of historic vulnera-
bility data—attack vectors—that can be mapped to a cyber
component through any cyber attribute or a combination of
cyber attributes.
Definition 5. A TAXONOMIC SCHEME, or schema, is a discrete
set of categories that can capture the structure of any cyber
component in a cyber-physical system to produce evidence.
Following the above definitions, the taxonomic scheme
should inform the following questions:
1) What is the subsystem?
2) How is it implemented?
3) Who does it talk to?
4) Why is it there?
The first question informs the model about the identity of
the subsystem. The second question provides the design details,
used by the model to characterize a possible real subsystem.
The third question identifies the required interactions between
the subsystem, ensuring that the composition of the full system
can provide its expected service—an important aspect of CPS
as indicated throughout the literature [12]. The fourth and last
question addresses the function of the subsystem and, therefore
informs about its relative criticality to the overall behavior of
CPS.
Answering the above questions sufficiently and constructing
a taxonomic scheme directed by them allows us to base our
analysis in methodical reasoning. Furthermore, by utilizing
methodical reasoning we are able to view the threat spaces of a
system holistically and take into account that a single segregated
component acts differently than when it coordinates with other
subsystems to compose a CPS. By using this approach, one is
better informed about the overall system security posture than
by analyzing just the system’s components individually.
B. Realization of the Taxonomic Scheme
Using the above questions as a guide and being aware of the
intrinsic structure and specificity contained in open vulnerability
databases, the following taxonomic scheme composes the
structure of any CPS and can assist in producing evidence:
∙ Operating System. Since CPS is composed of hardware
and software, it is important to be aware of the system
software hosted, such as Real-Time Operating Systems
(RTOS), executives, debuggers. In some cases, the em-
bedded devices may be programmed without an operating
system, a common term for which is “programmed on bare
metal.” Knowing this information—that is, CPS running
an embedded operating system—informs on possible
vulnerabilities, e.g., bugs in the Linux kernel.
∙ Device Name. The specific naming of a subsystem can
assist in finding device-specific vulnerabilities.
∙ Hardware. The decomposition of the specific device to its
possible exploitable hardware elements, e.g., what chipset
is on board.
∙ Firmware. The possible firmware and corresponding
drivers necessary to run the device.
∙ Software. In the event that the subsystem runs an RTOS
it is of importance to know the possible software that is
installed and can potentially introduce further vulnerabili-
ties.
∙ Communication. Any cyber or physical interaction the
CPS must implement in to provide its expected service.
∙ Entry Points. All possible accessible entry points to the
system. This attribute allows us to filter components that
are part of the attack surface.
C. Attributes
In accordance with the taxonomic scheme above, a minimum
set of attributes is presented in Table I. The example comes
from an NMEA GPS and its corresponding attributes stem from
design documents and are refined using data sheets. Further
refinement of those attributes is allowed. This dissemination
is mostly based on the information provided in the design
requirements documents but can also include information
provided by subject matter experts.
III. SYSML MODEL
Consider, for example, an Unmanned Aerial System (UAS)
that is used to assist in search and rescue operations where
minutes (or even seconds) count. In this domain, losing a
UAS is certainly going to risk longer mission times and can
potentially lead to an unsuccessful search and rescue operation.
For these types of safety-critical missions, it is essential to
assess the security posture of a given FCS design, so that
a threat actor cannot interfere with safety-critical operations.
For that reason we construct and evaluate an FCS model for
possible security violation in an evidence-based fashion.
Table I
A GPS EXAMPLE OF THE MINIMUM SET OF ATTRIBUTES NECESSARY TO
CREATE A SOUND, WELL-FORMED MODEL OF CPS. THESE ATTRIBUTES NEED
TO BE USED FOR ANY GIVEN SUBSYSTEM THAT IS PERTINENT TO ITS
EXPECTED SERVICE. THE MATCHING OF ATTACK VECTORS DERIVES FROM
THE ATTRIBUTES SPECIFIED IN THIS TABLE.
NMEA GPS
Category Attributes
Operating system Bare metal
Device Name Adafruit Ultimate GPS
Hardware Mediatek MTK 3339 chipset
Firmware Communication protocol drivers
Software ∅
Communication I2C, RS232, UART, RF
Entry Points RF
In the most general sense an FCS implements all the
capabilities and control surfaces needed to operate an au-
topilot [13], [14]. This autopilot is used to fly UAS and is
usually controlled through a ground control station. An FCS is
composed of several compromisable cyber subsystems whose
intended function is to modify and control physical parameters,
e.g., control of engine throttle for speed, changing the direction
based on a navigational goal by controlling the aileron, etc. By
this definition, an FCS is a CPS and prime example of analysis
given its ubiquity and utility in many domain areas. An FCS
is safety-critical system, in the sense that if there is a hazard,
either artificial through a cyber attack or by natural faults, it
can cause severe consequences.
The model of the FCS is encoded in an Internal Block
Diagram (IBD) (Fig. 2). An IBD representation is used to define
a system’s structure. Traditionally, this model contains only
generic representations of subsystems, e.g., power system, en-
gine sensor, magnetometer and general information about flows
of information, e.g., energy, command, sensor measurement.
The taxonomic scheme described in the previous section adds
specific implementation information that assists threat analysts
in finding possible vulnerabilities and, consequently, associated
attack vectors. This specific implementation information is
encoded using part properties for component attributes, e.g.,
what type of GPS, and connectors for interaction attributes,
e.g., using the I2C protocol.
Part properties encode further attribute information in a
manner that is easy to parse by threat analysts. Part properties,
as the name implies, are attributes that can further characterize
an IBD block and take the form of ⟨part name⟩ ∶ ⟨type⟩.
Additionally, they can be decomposed to further part properties
to make general categories of attributes—this can be seen
by the decomposition of the Operating System type in the
Primary Application Processor to further part properties
(Fig. 2). Moreover, part properties can construct a new IBD by
themselves to define the connectivity between components in
a collection of part properties. This is useful in more complex
systems where the connections might have different levels of
abstraction. Part properties define the structure and composition
FCS Hardware Stack connectionsHardware Stack[Block] ibd [  ] 
UART or RS232 protocol drivers and ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 : Firmware
RF or Local Access through UART : Entry Point
API to change mode of operation : Software
XBee PRO 900 MHz ISM : Hardware
Bare Metal : Operating System
XBee : Radio Module
comm port radio
I2C and SPI and UART and SDIO low-level drivers : Firmware
Autopilot Navigation and Control Algorithms : Software
ChibiOS : Operating System
ARM STM32F4 : Primary Application Processor
comm port radio
comm port eth
comm port i2c
I2C or RS232 or UART protocol drivers : Firmware
Mediatek MTK 3339 chipset : Hardware
RF or Local Access : Entry Point
Bare Metal : Operating System
Adafruit Ultimate GPS : NMEA GPS
comm port i2c
MPU 9150 : Accelerometer Gyroscope Magnetometer comm port i2c
MS4525DO 1 : Differential Pressure Sensor
comm port i2c
MS4525DO 2 : Absolute Pressure Sensor
comm port i2c
ARM STM32F0 : Safety Switch Processor comm port actuators
comm port i2c
DP83848 Ethernet : Wireless Modem
comm port ethernet
Servos : Actuators
actuator port
comm port actuators
Throttle : Control Surface
Elevator : Control Surface
actuator port
Rudder : Control Surface
Aileron : Control Surface
Physical Movement
PWM
MII protocol over RMII bus
I2C Protocol
RS232 Protocol
Fig. 2. The Internal Block Diagram (IBD) SysML model of the Flight Control System (FCS) with all the necessary attributes to characterize the primary
application processor, the NMEA GPS, and the radio module. This model can inform about possible architectural changes at the early stages of design to avoid
using components that have reported vulnerabilities or clearly mitigate against these vulnerabilities through better informed requirements. As such, we are able
to construct systems that are secure by design.
of the system.
Finally, connector types define source and target relationships
as well as the type of interaction, digital protocols, analog
inputs, or possibly physical actions. For example, the connection
between the Safety Switch Processor is digital and uses Pulse
Width Modulation (PWM) commands to move the servos
(Fig. 2). The servos then provide the physical pull to either open
the throttle further—to gain velocity—or change the direction
of movement by controlling the aileron.
IV. MODEL TRANSFORMATION
A model transformation is used so that the modeling
methodology presented in this paper is agnostic to specific
modeling tools and languages. To achieve this transformation,
ARM STM32F4
DP83848 Ethernet
 MII protocol over RMII bus
XBee
 RS232 Protocol
Adafruit Ultimate GPS
 I2C Protocol
ARM STM32F0
 I2C Protocol
MS4525DO 1
 I2C Protocol
MS4525DO 2
 I2C Protocol
MPU 9150
 I2C Protocol
Servos
 PWM
Aileron
 Physical Movement
Rudder
 Physical Movement
Throttle
 Physical Movement
Elevator
 Physical Movement
Fig. 3. The Internal Block Diagram (IBD) (Fig. 2) of the Flight Control System (FCS) maps directly to a graph structure (the part property type is omitted for
visualization purposes). This allows us to extract the elements in an internal block diagram without loss of any information vital for cybersecurity assessment.
The graph structure can be further input to other analysis techniques and provide a schema for the topological definition of a Cyber-Physical System (CPS). In
this instance the vertex attributes can be accessed through the GraphML specification even though they are not visualized here.
we construct a generic formalism for SysML IBD based on
graph structures. The formalism is used as a basis for a tool
which extracts the information from the IBD and encodes it
in GraphML. GraphML is based on XML and consists of the
de facto schema for sharing graphs [15]. Transforming SysML
models to a graph should allow, in the future, the model
to be analyzed with a variety techniques. This is potentially
beneficial because SysML has limited verification capabilities
and requires a specific modeling methodology to produce
validated results. The following formalism assures that all
SysML information and their corresponding properties are not
lost in the transformation to GraphML.
A. Formal Semantics of Internal Block Diagrams
Computing networks are typically reasoned about using graph
structures, where the vertices represent assets and the edges
represent their immediate connections. This is no different
for CPS [16]. This paper extends the definition of assets to
encompass every subsystem in a CPS, which comprises of
more than the computing systems, including but not limited
to imagery payload, actuators, sensors and their data links to
the computing systems. We formalize these definitions, which
are initially encoded in a SysML IBD, using standard graph
notation below.
Definition 6. An INTERNAL BLOCK DIAGRAM is a graph 퐺 ∶=
(푉 , 푃 , src, tgt,), where 푉 is the set of vertices of 퐺; 푃 is
the set of ports of 퐺; src, tgt ∶ 푃 → 푉 functions source and
target for 퐺 respectively, and  is the set of attributes of 퐺. 푉
represents the components of a cyber-physical system, 푃 the
inputs and outputs corresponding to the components, src, tgt
the directionality of the possible cyber or physical interactions
between components, and  the associated descriptors for a
given vertex or connection.
An example transformed system graph is depicted in Fig. 3
where not all information is necessarily visualized but is
encoded in the GraphML format and can be accessed pro-
gramatically.
Definition 7. A PART PROPERTY in an internal block diagram
is a function attr푣 ∶ 푉 → 푣, where 푉 is the set of verticesof 퐺 and 푣 the set of vertex attributes, such that 푣 ⊆ .
Consider a single mapping for the attributes of the NMEA
GPS, (Table I and Fig. 2):
attr푣(GPS)↦ {Bare Metal,Adafruit Ultimate GPS,
Mediatek MTK 3339 chipset,… ,RF}.
Definition 8. A CONNECTOR in an internal block diagram is
a function attr푝 ∶ 푃 → 푝, where 푃 is the set of ports of 퐺and 푝 the set of port attributes, such that 푝 ⊆ .
For example, the tuple of vertices below passed into the port
attribute function will provide the edge-specific attributes for
that tuple: attr푝({GPS,STM32F4})↦ {I2C Protocol}.Given the above definitions, we transform the SysML model
to the neutral GraphML format and can further use it as input
to other analysis techniques, including finding attack vectors.
V. MATCHING POTENTIAL ATTACK VECTORS
To evaluate the model we find and map applicable attack
vectors for subsystems of the FCS model described above
(Fig. 2 and Fig. 3). This analysis is based on analyzing open
vulnerability databases to find possible attacks and provide
possible design mitigation strategies. For example, given a
component with an associated set of attack vectors, one can
then assess the risk and potentially find another component
that provides the same expected service without any reported
vulnerabilities.
A. Experimental Setting
Toward the evaluation of the model’s fidelity we find
potential attack vectors for the subsystems of the FCS model
using cve-search.4 This online database not only provides
possible CVE entries that are applicable based on the query
strings produced by the models attributes, but can also relate to
4CVE-SEARCH PROJECT, cve-search.org (perma.cc/5J2M-VAGC)
CWE-264: Permissions, Privileges, and Access Control
CVE-2016-6788  CVE-2016-3801
Fig. 4. The two possible Adafruit Ultimate GPS attack vectors found in CVE
share the same CWE category. This can inform the designer about general
issues with the specific, chosen subsystem and to possibly look at substitutes
with no reported vulnerabilities. Otherwise, the designers might choose to
clearly document this class of vulnerabilities and construct solid requirements
to mitigate such possible violation of system assets.
higher levels of abstraction, e.g., CWE or CAPEC, to further
understand the possible impact of a given attack.
We assume that a system is vulnerable if any single attack
vector from the databases maps to any single attribute of the
system model. For example, if an attack vector targets Operating
System ‘A’ with Driver ‘B’, we consider it a vulnerability even
if the model includes only ‘A’ or ‘B’; it does not have to
contain both, even if the attack pattern specifies them together.
This assumption is reasonable because a large number of
vulnerabilities that are reported have to do with systems that are
popular and widely used, e.g., the Android operating system and
corresponding drivers. This assumption allows for extrapolation
from such (specific) reports to better understand the security
posture of the model where, at the moment, no embedded
system vulnerability database exists.
Furthermore, it is uncommon for users to update their
embedded devices, and this assumption still allows the analyst
to take into account vulnerabilities that may have been fixed
in newer versions of firmware or software.
Finally, we assume that a subsystem that has no reported
attack vectors is more secure than one that does. This work
does not focus on zero-days because there is currently no
way—at the design phase—to assess zero-day vulnerability
just by analyzing the architecture of the system. However, our
approach also works using private or proprietary vulnerability
databases. As long as there exist historic data on the given
subsystem, this approach allows an analyst to identify them
and better inform system designers. In attempting to violate
the security posture of a system, a given intelligent threat actor
will, most likely, use a set of techniques they are familiar
with rather than come up with new techniques tailored to the
individual system [17].
B. Results
This section describes a security assessment of two compo-
nents in the FCS that can cause full degradation of expected
service through exploiting historic vulnerabilities. Specifically,
this analysis focuses on (1) the NMEA GPS device, which is
necessary to provide location data and (2) the radio module,
which is necessary to communicate with the ground control
station or in the instance of manual control, the operator.
NMEA GPS. Given the specification of the Adafruit
Ultimate GPS (Table I and Fig. 2) we search through CVE to
find two possible attack vectors (Fig. 4). The first is CVE-2016-
3801, which is a reported vulnerability specific to Android
devices and targets the Mediatek GPS driver in the embedded
operating system by crafting an application that can exploit the
driver to gain system privileges. Even if an Android device is
not specifically in use, it is possible to misconfigure or program
the FCS in such a way that the attack vectors are applicable,
making this a threat one must account for when designing the
system. The second is CVE-2016-6788, an attack that targets
MediaTek I2C drivers and subsequently allows an attacker
to elevate their privileges and execute arbitrary code. This
vulnerability was also reported for Android but, again, it can
be applicable to the design of the FCS. Whilst both attacks
take advantage of the GPS, they actually target the primary
application processor (Fig. 5) with possibly devastating effects
to the system’s expected service.
Further, the two vulnerabilities can form an attack chain by
first using CVE-2016-3801 to gain access to the system, which
would require an operator possibly accepting a request from
the attacker, and then using CVE-2016-6788 to further elevate
their privileges without having to go through operator input. It
would be difficult to find these attacks without decomposing
the NMEA GPS device down to its specific implementation
including the chipset it is employing and the required firmware
to operate. Hence, system designers would have been unaware
of this possible attack chain and would have to add further
security considerations for this component post-deployment,
instead of switching it with another that has no historic reported
vulnerabilities and, therefore, presumably less risk.
Radio Module. Another part of the system that could
be attacked is the XBee radio module, which requires drivers
for the ZigBee IEEE 802.15.4 protocol. Its specification can
be seen in the SysML diagram (Fig. 2). One of the possible
attacks is described in CVE-2015-8732 and CVE-2015-6244
(these attacks have different bugs associated with them but
result in the same effect), where an intelligent threat actor
constructs packets that cause out-of-bound read and application
crashes, resulting in a successful denial of service. Without
radio communication the FCS would not be able to coordinate
with the ground control station and it would go to a fail-
safe mode, which could be detrimental to the mission it was
planned to carry out. Knowledge of such attacks to the system’s
designers can lead to choosing a more robust, security wise,
radio module for the implementation of the FCS.
C. Discussion
The aforementioned example results further illustrate the
need for early detection of vulnerabilities. While this work
has not focused on evaluating elements of the attack surface–
that is, components exposed to intelligent threat actors that
can act as entry points into the systems structure–this paper
demonstrates that a model can assist in generating security by
design. This approach generates evidence (the historic data
from open databases) and in future work will be used to design
CVE-2016-3801
ARM STM32F4 : Primary Application Processor
CVE-2016-6788
Adafruit Ultimate GPS : NMEA GPS
Fig. 5. An intelligent threat actor can potentially take advantage of the use
of the Adafruit Ultimate GPS drivers and can completely violate the systems
expected service by escalating their privileges by either using the attack vectors
presented individually or for a higher impact in sequence (attack chain). The
dashed red edges indicate a given attack step, while the red solid edges indicate
violation of data exchange. Since one of the attacks can lead to arbitrary code
execution it can violate any path from the microcontroller to the sensory
systems, meaning that such an attack would cause full degradation of expected
service.
the systems with hardware and software that is historically
more secure at no additional cost, except those costs required
for the security analysis. If architectural changes are not an
option, it is still crucial to be aware of possible vulnerabilities
and impose clear system requirements to preempt or mitigate
against classes of attacks.
Without the generalized taxonomic scheme and its generated
specification for the system, we would not have been able to
match evidence to subsystems. This could have led to insecure
systems getting deployed for safety-critical applications, which
in turn can cause hazardous behaviors or, in the worst-case
scenario, controlled accidents by intelligent threat actors.
VI. CONCLUSIONS & BEYOND
In this paper we have presented a framework that character-
izes a characteristic set of attributes for each given subsystem
in a CPS. These attributes construct well-formed models that
are sufficiently detailed to allow for security posture evaluation
of the system they specify. This framework is built on the
examination of historic vulnerability data from databases,
termed evidence, which apply to the system model based on
those attributes. We have shown that this framework produces
model sufficiency by mapping attack vectors for a possible
NMEA GPS and radio module. While the method is agnostic
to the modeling language, we represent the system in SysML,
which is ubiquitous in systems engineering.
A future direction can use the findings of this research to
automate the process of matching attack vectors. Towards this
automation, we have shown the versatility of the method by
transforming the SysML model to a generic graph metamodel
using a standard graph schema based on XML, GraphML. A
possible extension in this direction is to use the extracted system
structure and apply techniques from computational linguistics
to automatically produce attack vectors for each subsystems.This may allow threat analysts to assess the security posture
of increasingly complex systems.
Finally, through this work we have provided an answer to a
largely open question in the field of CPS. Namely, what level
of design detail does the system model have to capture to allow
for the evaluation of its security properties? The advantage of
our model is that it views the system from its characteristic
and identifiable attributes and does not depend on its function
to provide a holistic view of its security posture.
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